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THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO DEVELORvENT AND THE LAW OF G.A.T.T.
Kabir-Ur-Rahman Khan
This paper deals with two inter-related questions: what are the legal
implications of the international right to development, and how this
right is being implemented through the law of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Since there is, as yet, no generally agreed
content of the international right to development, it is necessary to
deal with this question first.
International Right to Development
The International Right to Development, sometimes referred to as a
"third generation right" is of comparatively recent origin. Although
some of its elements may be traced back to the Charter of the United
Nations 1945,1 the Philadelphia Declaration 19442 (now contained in
the constitution of the International Labour Organization), the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 19483 and resolutions of the General
Assembly and Economic and Social Council of the United Nations,4 the
term was first used by the Commission of 1uman Rights in 1977. In its
Resolution 4 (XXXIII) the Commission makes a direct reference to their
right to development. The Secretary General was invited to prepare in
conjunction with UNESCO a report on the "international dimension of the
right to development as a human right in relation with other human rights
based on international co-operation."'5 Its contents are not fixed. A
Working Party of government experts6 established by the Economic and
Social Council prepared a Draft Declaration in 1982. This provides a
useful guide to the contemporary thinking about this right. The right
has individual, national as well as international dimensions. The term
"development" is understood "as a global economic, social, cultural,
political and juridical process, both in its collective and individual
dimensions, for the welfare of all people." More specifically, the
development "is understood as a process aiming at the improvement of the
material and spiritual standards of living of all members of society so
as to promote and protect human 
dignity.'oa
The Right to Development is based on, or inferred from, several
existing rights, such as the right to life in human dignity and peace,
the right of self-determination, the right cf each nation to choose its
own development model and its political economic and social system, the
principle of sovereignty over natural resources, wealth and economy and
the right of people to an active and peaceful existence.8
The responsibility to implement this right rests with states; but the
international community has responsibilities as well. This is recognised
in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 55 of the Charter states:
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"...the United Nations shall promote ... (b) higher standard of living,
full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and
development."9 This obligation of the United Nations is the obligation
of the international community and, in law, is distinct from the
obligation of individual members of the United Nations. The Draft
Declaration on The Right to Development, similarly, recognises that the
right to development implies that states and the international community
as a whole should aim at the creation of local and national
conditionsl0 for the enjoyment of this right. States and the
international community also have similar responsibility for the creation
of international conditions for the promotion and protection of this
right. "States", the Draft Declaration holds, "shall have the duty,
individually and collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to
development. "11
The Draft Declaration also presents the means for the realisation of
the right to development at the international level. These include the
establishment of a new international economic order providing for:
(a) individual and collective measures to
strengthen economic trade and technical
co-operation among developing countries;
(b) the just and equitable international division
of labour which requires the industrialisation of
develcping countries, .freer access.to markets of
developed countries, food security, transfer of
adequate resources through trade ... eouitable
remuneration for primary commodities, the
protection of the purchasing capacity of
developing countries and just terms of trade;
(c) democratic participation in international
economic institutions, particularly ... the
General Agreement;
(d) the granting of generalised preferential,
non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment to
developing countries in international economic
relations, wherever feasible.12
The above account gives sufficient indication as to the contents,
bases, and nature of the right to development, and some of the means by
which it is envisaged the right is to be achieved and implemented. It
also demonstrates some of its deficiencies. The Declaration is not
formally accepted. Even among the Working Party, there is a vast
divergence of views.13
There is a certain inconsistency in the Draft Declaration: on the one
hand it recognises and elaborates the right to development as an
independent right, and on the other when dealing with its implementation,
reference is made not to this right or the Declaration but tc the
Universal Declaration of Human Rightsl4 and to the UN Covenants of
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Human Rights. This is perhaps done to accommodate those states, mainly
western powers, who see human rights specifically in the terms of the
individual.
Furthermore, since the GATT, strictly speaking, is not a specialised
agency of the United Nations, the Declaration, even when adcpted, can at
best have approbative value vis-a-vis the GATT; it cannot in itself
obviate a need to demonstrate that the GATT has, through legal
transplantation or direct adoption, accepted the implications of the
international Right to Development.
This paper deals with international aspects of the right to
development, which is termed an International Right to Development.
Therefore, the focus concentrates upon the measures which states have
taken severally or collectively, including through and by the GATT,
towards the implementation of this right.
As a preface to the discussion on the implementation, it may be noted
that international economic institutions are based on certain economic
policies and precepts, often tacit and subterranean. The institutions
created at Bretton Woods, the World Bank and IMF, 15 and those
instituted in the early fifties, including the GATT, are largely rooted
in laissez-faire precepts. The implementation of the International Right
to Development thus necessitates not only the modification of existing
instruments and the adoption of new ones but it also requires the
modification or even replacement of the precepts and policies on which
these organisations are based. Thus international economic policy has
itself become an essential part of the legal process of change.
With all its complexities, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
is rooted in two major principles of International Economic Law:
reciprocity and the most-favoured nations (MFN) procedures. In order to
guard against the unfair application of domestic laws, the principles of
national treatment, equitable treatment and the principles of good
neighbourliness are also used. The principles of reciprocity and MFN are
in themselves sound, but because of the special situation of the
developing countries and because of the peculiar application of some of
the provisions of the GATT, these principles have hindered the
development of the poor countries. The solution, therefore, lies in
modification, even if temporary, in their application, or where such
modification is not forthcoming, at least some circumnavigation of these
principles.- Recognition of some alternative principles is also called
for. Let us take the recognised principles separately and examine their
functions.
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Reciprocity
In the exchange of tariff concessions through multilateral trade
negotiations under the auspices of the GATT, the principle of reciprocity
has a cardinal role. The expansion of world trade and what in
contemporary terms may be described as development, are to be achieved
through "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements.",16 This provision, contained in the preamble of the
GATT, has further been reiterated in Article XXVIII which specifically
states that the negotiations under the GATT will be on a "reciprocal and
mutually advantageous basis."17 This principle is further reenforced
by the rules of negotiations which require inter alia that offers of
concessions ;e made by and to principal suppliers of items under
negotiation. A fundamental assumption underlying this principle is
that the members of GATT are able to reciprocate and thereby offer and
secure trade concessions and that the economies of the member countries,
are more or less homogeneous. Both the elements of this assumption, in
relation to the developing countries, are largely false.19
Most of the developing countries rely, for their domestic revenues
and foreign exchange earnings, on one or two primary commodities which
they produce. These are the only assets which they can bring to the
multilateral trade negotiations. But these assets have long been made
almost worthless insofar as the operation of the GATT is concerned.
Agricultural products, the mainstay of the economies of most of the
developing countries, have long been virtually excluded from the
framework of the multilateral trade negotiations of the GATT. This dates
back to 1955 when the United States, in order to provide protection to
its domestic agricultural products, secured exemptions from certain
obligations under the GATT including the cardinal obligation to give MFN
treatment on such products.
This was not the only deficiency. The developing countries were
disadvantaged in other ways. In the early years of its existence, the
GATT carried a doctrinal assumption that with the reduction of tariffs,
the expansion of world trade and the achievement of other objectives of
the GATT almost followed automatically. It was not sufficiently
recognised that some countries, especially developing countries, were not
able to reduce their tariffs and that the problems of these countries
were such they could not be cured by the reduction of tariffs alone. The
Harberler Report in 1958 recognised that "there is some substance in the
feeling of disquiet among primary producing countries that the present
rules and conventions about commercial policy are relatively unfavourable
to them."'20 The Action Programme, initiated in response to this
report, recognised the need, inter alia, to deal with the problem of the
widespread use of protectionist measures against primary products of
developing countries, and in particular, the need to deal witn the
question of export earnings of developing countries.21 Later in 1963,
the ministers of the member countries recognised "the need for an
adequate legal and institutional framework in connection with the
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work of expanding the trade of less developed countries."' 2 2 This and
further considerations in the GATT resulted in the addition of some new
provisions as Part IV to the General Agreement. 23 Significantly,
almost contemporaneous to these changes in the GATT was the establishment
of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which
recognised and gave emphasis to, the development needs of developing
countries and prescribed development goals and specified principles for
achieving those goals.24 The developments in the UNCTAD were, strictly
speaking, not related to the GATT, but as Jackson observes, "have had a
psychological impact on national representatives to GATT ... Perhaps it
was realised that the developing countries had some moral force behind
their position, even though they had little economic force.",2 5
Part IV introduces or reiterates the development objectives in the
GATT, and provides for albeit temporary and unilateral, measures for
achieving those goals.26 The actual practice of these provisions, and
subsequent developments in the GATT and elsewhere, have led to the
improvement of the implementation machinery.
For. a considerable time in the practice of the GATT, reciprocal
tariff concessions, based on the precept of laissez-faire, have dominated
negotiations. Part IV of the GATT rectifies" tnis imoalance. It recalls
and reiterates the objective of the GATT which, though contained in the
original agreement, have slipped into oblivion. Among these is the
objective that relations "in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living ensuing
full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income
and effective demand, developing the fulluse of the resources of the
world and expanding the production and exchange of goods.'"27 It is now
recognised that these development objectives have specific and greater
relevance to developing countries.za
Furthermore, Part IV draws upon and gives status to certain
fundamentals which should have been recognised as a matter of logic in
the first place, namely that developing countries constitute a special
case and need special treatment; that their economic situation is not at
par with that of the developed countries; that export earnings constitute
an important element in bringing development, and that rules of
international trade "should be consistent with the objectives set forth
in Article XXXVI". In other words, it is now conceded that the principle
of reciprocity is not for universal application; indeed when applied
among unequals it fails to bring reciprocal benefits. The departure from
reciprocity is heralded in these words:
The developed contracting parties do not expect
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other
barriers to the trade of less-developed
contracting parties. 2 9
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One of the tangible products of Part IV is the Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP). The salient elements of the GSP are: it is voluntary,
unilateral, its scope, terms and beneficiaries are determined by the
preference-giving country.30 Originally the GSP was treated as a
deviation from the main provisions of the GATT and hence it could be
operated and implemented only through special dispensation by the
.GATT.31 The benefits which accrued through preferences granted under
this system even if the EEC is taken into account are not significant.
In 1980 it amounted to U.S. $27 billion.3 2
One of the consequences of the unilateral application of the GSP in
recent years has been that the preference-giving countries have
introduced a "graduating" mechanism. The beneficiaries who attain a
specified proportion of the market in the preference-giving countries are
automatically excluded from further benefits relating to that
commodity.33
Improvements in the GSP are now sought to achieve some stability,
objectivity and uniformity in the scheme of .individual countries.
Co-ordination is also considered desirable. One legal development
emanating from the Tokyo Round is that there is now a general legal basis
for the GSP. The Decision of 28 November, 1979 of the GATT provides that
the contracting parties "may accord differential and more favourable
treatment to developing countries without according such a treatment to
other contracting parties."'34 The principle of non-reciprocity in
relation to developing countries is also reiterated:
Developed contracting parties shall therefore not
seek, neither shall less-developed contracting
parties be required to make, concessions that are
consistent with the latter's development,
financial and trade needs.3 5
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
The MFN principle has a two-fold function in the GATT. When applied
to tariff concessions and other benefits relating to trade, it is a
principle of distribution, aiming to ensure that benefits are applicable
to all members of the GATT. In the context of domestic measures
impinging upon concessions and benefits, the most-favoured-nation
principle transforms itself into a shelf of non-discrimination. Thus, a
member having a valid ground for imposing quantitative restrictions on
imports, say for balance of payment reasons, is required, according to
the MFN principle, to apply these restrictions on a non-discriminatorybasis.36p
Insofar as the distributive function of the MFN clause is concerned,
any digression from the principle of reciprocity, is also a digression
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from the MFN principle. The GSP is, however, a valid exception to the
MFN. The developed members of the GATT who operate this scheme-in
relation to developing countries are not required to extend benefits
under it to all members of the GATT.37
Another exception to the MFN principle relates to custom unions, free
trade areas or arrangements with a view to their formation.38 The
rationale for this exception is rooted in the theory of custom unions,
which inter alia assumes that the removal of custom and other barriers
among two or more nations and the formation of a single economic unit is
conducive to the expansion of trade among the parties of such a union,
and eventually leads to the expansion of world trade. Thus any temporary
inconvenience or loss resulting from such an association is justifiable,
provided the loss is adequately compensated.
Because of this theoretical approbation, the GATT has given a very
loose and acquiescent interpretation to Article XXIV which deals with
regional arrangements. Any benefit that developirI countries have
received from such interpretation of Article XXIV3  is not exclusive to
them but is shared with all members of the GATT. In fact the greatest
beneficiaries of this lax interpretation are the developed industrialised
countries who are parties to such associations. The European Economic
Community with its vast network of free trade areas and other
preferential arrangements is a notable example.
Two points relating to regional arrangements should be made. First,
the consequences of an unbridled use of regional arrangements were
unforeseen at the time of the negotiations of the General Agreement. The
custom unions in the nineteenth century and in the period preceding the
establishment of the GATT were few in number, their scope was limited,
and they certainly did not involve, as the EEC an¢^its related trading
groups do, multiple layers of varied preferences. u Article XXIV
recognises the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the
development of "closer integration" between the economies of countries
"who are parties to voluntary agreements establishing such
arrangements."'41 The "closer integration", it may be argued is the
operative condition.
Secondly, the operation of Article XXIV has led to some results which
though speciously justifiable in the narrow confines of economic theory
are not necessarily conducive to the establishment of a global system for
the expansion of world trade or to the achievement of the development
objectives of the GATT. Some of these consequences may be noted:
(1) The purpose of a custom union, Article XXIV requires, should be
"to facilitate trade between the constituting territories and not to
raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such
territories.'42 Whether a proposed custom union or free trade area is
trade-diverting or not cannot be proved at the inception of a plan,
therefore, every plan in practice carries a favourable assumption that it
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is trade-creating.
(2) The requirement of "closer integration", with its corollary that
"substantially all trade" among constituting parties should be covered by
such arrangements has been steadily whittled down. The phrase
"substantially all trade" now has strange connotations. For example it
-may not mean the sector for which custom union is formed, say coal and
steel, and similarly, it may exclude the agricultural sector altogether,
as with the European Free Trade Area.43
(3) Article XXIV validates custom unions, free trade area/or interim
arrangements leading to the formation of custom unions or free trade
areas. The EEC is all three: a custom union among its ten members, a
network of free trade areas in relation to the African Caribbean and
Pacific Countries who are parties to the Lom6 Convention regime, and an
"interim arrangement" in respect of certain countries in Southern Europe
and the Middle East. 44
Such an open-ended interpretation has two consequences which violate
the design of the GATT. It turns the MFN regime established by the GATT
into a least-favoured-nation regime. Secondly, which is more relevant to
the question of development, it leads to inevitable discrimination among
devloping countries, favouring the ACP countries at the expense of those
countries who are not parties to the Lom& Convention. Such a fluid
interpretation of Article XXIV, though formally valid, violates the
precepts of Part IV whose raison d'&tre is the establishment of a
non-discriminatory and differential and more favourable treatment for the
developing countries, as a whole.
(4) Since Article XXIV does not prescribe a time limit for interim
arrangements such arrangements become, in effect, preferential
agreements, which, broadly speaking, are contrary to the GATT.
Preferences which developing countries receive from developed
countries or give to one another thus fall in the following categories:
Custom unions or free trade area freely recognised and legitimised by
Article XXIV; associations which involve discrimination against the
developing countries not parties to such special arrangements; and the
GSP, which has development as its objective.
Preferences Based on Economic Co-operation Among Developing Countries
Another category of preferential treatment comprises preferential
arrangements among developing countries themselves, the legality of which
does not depend upon Article XXIV. Two such arrangements - illustrative
of the contenporary development towards the implementation of
International Right to Development - may be noted here.
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(1) The Trade Agreement between India, United Arab Republic and
Yugoslavia 1967. This Tripartite Agreement45 is a considerable step
forward towards achieving development objectives. The agreement aims to
increase the trade among the three parties and provides a framework of
mutual economic co-operation. At its inception it was seen as a prelude
to a wider framework of economic co-operation among developing
countries. The agreement provides for tariff concessions for specific
products of the parties.
The Contracting Parties, by their Decision of 14 November 1968,
approved the agreement on the condition, inter alia, that the participant
states shall consult with any contracting party which considers that its
advantages are impeded by the operation of the tripartite agreement. It
also required periodic reports and review. The.Decision also stated:
That a principle aim of the contracting Parties is
the promotion of the trade and export earnings of
developing countries for the furtherance of their
economic development.46
During the proceedings before the Working Committee, which was set up
to examine the agreement, the Indian representative described the
agreement as a measure of self-help in trade expansion, and pointed out
some of its special features. It aimed at the rational expansion of
production as well as trade. The products for tariff concessions were
chosen with a view to creating trade among the participating states.47
It was generally recognised that the tripartite agreement offered a
new technique of co-operation among developing countries in the interests
of trade expansion. The representatives of the three participating
states reiterated that the agreement was in pursuance of their
obligations under Part IV and consistent with the spirit of the General
Agreement. The United States representative held that the Decision
approving the tripartite agreement was intended to meet the requirements
of waiver under Article XXV:5.48 The Decision itself does not make any
reference to that Article. 4 9
(2) The Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations Among Developing
Countries 1971. This Protocol takes measures of self-help and mutual
co-operation even further. Trade expansions among the participating
countries are seen as measures of expanding production and achieving
benefits of specialisation and economies of scale. The Protocol
reiterates that the members of the GATT have recognised that preferences
among developing countries, "appropriately administered and subject to
the necessary safeguards, could make an important contribution to the
trade among developing countries."50
Concessions secured under the Protocol are available to all
participating countries who have participated in the negotiation of such
concessions. The participating states undertakq to maintain the
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substantive value of the concessions. Special measures restricting trade
from the participating states for balance of payment reasons are allowed;
similarly, emergency measures to deal with serious injury threatened or
caused by the increased imports of some products are sanctioned,51
similarly to Article XXIV of the GATT.
The Protocol is open to all developing countries. In the
negotiations for accession of a new member the needs of present and
future development shall be taken into account and in appropriate cases a
country may be allowed to accede to the Protocol without negotiations on
tariff concessions. Bangladesh was admitted in this manner.52 The
administration of the agreement is entrusted to a committee of
participating countries. Decisions are taken therein by simple majority,
with the exception of modification, to the agreement. This termination,
or accession require a two-third majority.53
The preferential arrangements of the Protocol were approved by the
Decision of 26 November 1971, (and to that extent constitute a waiver of
Article I(1) of the GATT), with a proviso that "any such preferential
treatment shall be designed to facilitate trade between participants and
not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties.",54
Notification of preferential concessions and, at the request of any
contracting parties, consultation, on the rectification of impaired
benefits, are required.
The Protoc was signed by sixteen countries and came into force in
February 1973." Several other countries have since then joined the
agreement.56 Trade among the participating countries has expanded
significantly; from US $242.m(1972) to US $137.8m(1976). In 1979 it
extended to US $329m. 5 7
In an evaluation of the Protocol, the Committee on Trade and
Development observes:
"It would appear to be the case that the initial
experience of this pioneering effort at
international trade relations among developing
countries has demonstrated that such a system can
work in favour of the ..... developing countries
on the basis of complementaries in their
production and trading patterns taking into
account regional and sub-regional trade and
economic groupings without adversely affecting the
interests of other trading partners." ' 5 8
The legal basis of the Agreement is now the Enabling Clause. 59
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Other Measures for Development.
In addition to the introduction of the principle of non-reciprocity
and the preferences of various categories discussed above, several other
measures designed to advance development objectives are permitted under
the GATT. Among these three may be noted briefly:
(1) Safeguard Action for Development Purposes. Article XXVIII of
the GATT provides for the release from obligations under the agreement
and protection from withdrawal of concessions where measures which might
otherwise be impugned are-designed to promote industries for development
purposes. But the conditions are so onerous, cumbersome and
time-consuming, that this device remains perhaps the least used. Only
four developing countries - Sri Lanka, Cuba, Haiti and India - are
reported to have utilised these provisions, all between 1949-1950.60
The GATT has now given greater flexibility to these provisions and
defined economic development more widely. In the Decision of 28 November
1979:
The CONTRACTING PARTIES recognise that the
implementation by less developed contracting
parties of programmes and policies of economic
development aimed at raising the standard of
living of the people may involve in addition to
establishment of particular industries the
development of new or the modification or
extension of existing production structure with. a
view to achieving fuller and more efficient use of
resources in accordance with the priorities of
their economic development.61
Justification for exceptional measures now extends to economic
development and is no longer confined to the establishment of new
industries.
(2) Technical Assistance. Technical assistance in the form of
fellowships, the organisation of courses on international commercial
policy and related subjects, expert advice on the multilateral trade
negotiations and the preparation of the background and statistical
information relevant to such negotiations and the establishment of the
joint, UNCTAD/GATT International Trade Centre62 are but some of the
examples of evergrowing technical assistance provided under the GATT.
(3) Committee on Trade and Development. This Committee, established
in 1965, provides a focus and forum for development issues and initiates
within GATT policies relating to development. It, inter alia, evaluates
the implementation of Part IV, the expansion of trade among developing
countries and other related matters.
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Conclusion
The GATT contained, albeit in embryonic form, measures for economic
development but these were overshadowed by the laissez-faire precepts
prevailing during its early phase. These measures were constrained by
rigid conditions and were ineffective in the face of the protectionist
policies of the major western powers. From 1960's progress towards
development objectives is discernable. This is reflected in the
International Trade Policy which now contains the elements of the
International Right to Development. Among the specific changes are the
principle of non-reciprocity, the various kinds of preferences given to,
or enjoyed among, developing countries, safeguard actions for
development, technical assistance and the Committee on Trade and
Development. These measures, though important, cannot however be
substitutes for some of the essential and related problems such as the
stabilisation of foreign exchange earnings and market security for the
primary products and manufactured goods of developing countries. There
is a need for greater co-ordination between the GATT and other
organisations dealing with development problems.
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